Review: Dewey: A Beginner\u27s Guide by Boisvert, Raymond D.
Book Review
Dewey: A Beginner’s Guide
Raymond D. Boisvert
David Hildebrand, Dewey: A Beginner’s Guide. Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 
2008. 247 pp. ISBN 978-1-85168-580-6. $14.95 (pbk.)
John Dewey’s early exposure to Hegel left  a “permanent deposit” on his thinking. 
Dewey’s Hegelian side does not emerge in the usual sense of someone predicting the 
march of Spirit through history.  Rather it is as the complete philosopher seeking, 
above all else, to leave nothing out. Such a philosopher criticized reifi ed abstrac-
tions, reinstated the centrality of relations, emphasized the importance of thinking 
ideas together with their history, and insisted on the interpenetration of individual 
and social.  Th is Hegelian inheritance, when passed through the fi lter of praxis, 
identifi es, for some interpreters (I plead guilty) the strength of Dewey’s philosophy. 
 Coexisting with this dimension was another nineteenth-century strand, 
more consistent with theoria, the fascination with scientifi c method. Th is mani-
fests itself as the attempt to articulate a philosophy which would match scientifi c 
achievements.  For some pragmatists (once again, I plead guilty), moving forward 
means highlighting the Hegelian dimension and jettisoning  the  single methodol-
ogy fascination.  Most committed Deweyans, though, resist jettisoning anything. 
Th ey seek, instead, a way to keep both dimensions smoothly interwoven.  Such a 
seamless web approach is manifested in David Hildebrand’s helpful book Dewey: 
A Beginner’s Guide.  Th e volume, from Oneworld Publications,  makes up part of a 
series, Oneworld Beginner’s Guides, joining other texts on the likes of Nietzsche, 
Aquinas, Wittgenstein, Hume, and Rawls.
General introductions to Dewey are important.  Readers of Education and 
Culture will realize that Dewey was an all-around philosopher.  In the wider com-
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munity, where Dewey may be thought of exclusively as an educational reformer, it 
is necessary to provide reminders about how Dewey was, Hegel-like, a philosopher 
who sought to leave nothing out, someone as interested in art as he was in politics, 
education, and ethics. Th e strength of Hildebrand’s volume derives from the way he 
provides a cogent, well-explained, easily readable introduction to the entire Deweyan 
corpus.  In that way, his book joins others which have sought a similar overview, 
J. E. Tiles’ Dewey, Jim Campbell’s Understanding Dewey: Nature and Cooperative 
Intelligence, and my own John Dewey: Rethinking our Time.
Two major themes emerge, both of which recognize the Dewey-as-Hegelian 
dimension.  Th e fi rst is announced in the earliest pages. Dewey, says Hildebrand, of-
fers us a twenty-fi rst-century “philosophy of sustainability.” Th is is not to be thought 
of as a philosophy of stasis. Rather,  Dewey’s orientation allows us to “adapt, survive, 
and grow” (x).  By calling it a philosophy of sustainability Hildebrand eff ectively 
blocks the tendency to think of change for change’s sake. Sustainability emphasizes 
the aufh ebung dimension by which Hegel sought to move forward while preserv-
ing what was best from the past.  So, for Dewey, a philosophy that embraces change 
and growth will be one rooted in experience (here is where we fi nd the praxis at 
the root of pragmatism). It is not rooted in abstractions that remove us from our 
concrete lived situation.  
Hildebrand emphasizes another Hegelian dimension, that of contextualism 
or pan-relationalism, by describing Dewey’s philosophy as “ecological.”  In this way 
we recognize how “mind, body, and world are created by their mutual interaction” 
(21, 44, 150).  Dewey then becomes the philosopher for those who accept that our 
situatedness in the world is marked by  “ecological transactions that fund all types 
of experience” (150).  Th ose transactions, in turn, culminate in the optimal com-
bination of experiential wisdom and experimental approaches to change, that is, 
sustainability, in the best sense.  
A philosopher does not arrive at sustainability and ecological transactions 
haphazardly. Th ere are no more important choices for elucidation than identifying 
a thinker’s point of departure.  As one of my teachers, Etienne Gilson, was fond of 
saying, we can choose our starting points, but we cannot choose where those will 
lead us.  One of Hildebrand’s great strengths is how carefully he lays out two keys 
to understanding Dewey: a “practical starting point,” and a “melioristic motive” (4-
5).  Philosophy does not begin with artifi cial cutouts of reality.  Instead, it begins by 
“accepting experience as it is lived” (4).  Th is is the “radical empiricism” (i.e., full, 
complete, integrated  empiricism) that Dewey inherited from James.   Such a start-
ing point allows Dewey to avoid many presuppositions and problems that  plagued 
modern  (Descartes to Nietzsche) philosophy, problems such as whether we can 
know the external world at all, or the question labeled by Hildebrand as absurd, 
“why be moral?” (64).
Th is emphasis on getting starting points right is reinforced by the sequence 
of chapters: “Experience,” “Inquiry,” “Morality,” “Politics,” “Education,” “Aesthet-
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ics,” “Religion.” Th ese are followed by a brief “Conclusion: Philosophy as Equipment 
for Living,” in which the author sketches implications of a Deweyan approach in 
“healthcare and medical ethics,” “environmental ethics,” and “feminism.” As be-
fi ts an introductory text, Hildebrand typically identifi es a standard position, then 
contrasts it with the Deweyan alternative. 
In the chapter on experience, Hildebrand explores Dewey’s criticism of the 
“refl ex arc concept,” an approach which reduces experience to simple stimulus and 
response. Th is model misdiagnoses what are the fundamental ingredients in experi-
ence, that is, where we start from.  Instead of welcoming the data of a genuine, that 
is, radical empiricism, it atomizes the components, reifying them as an initially dis-
jointed concatenation of parts.  It also disregards our fundamentally active dimen-
sion.  “No child is a passive spectator” (15).  Th e neutral, detached spectator on which 
the refl ex arc depends is another contrived cutout.  It is a product of an artifi cially 
atomizing empiricism, not of what William James called a “radical” empiricism. 
In the inquiry chapter, Hildebrand’s foil is modern dualism, the separation 
of mind from reality. Once committed to this starting point, certain questions 
become prominent.  Th e most pressing is how a mind could “get beyond its own 
thoughts and feelings to know the objective world” (46).  Alter the starting point, 
remove the cutout into mind versus nature, and this question fades in signifi cance. 
Pragmatism replaces it with instrumentalism.  Knowing now becomes “a natural 
function, continuous with the rest of experience.” Th e description of the knowledge 
situation shift s in the direction of praxis, emphasizing how “concepts and ideas are 
tools or instruments” (52).  
When it comes to morality, the modern assumption is galvanized around 
the notion of a single biological motivation: self-interest. Th en the question “why 
be moral” becomes pressing.  In addressing this issue, philosophers have them-
selves sought a single pivot as the “one explanatory principle” underlying morality. 
Dewey’s radical empiricism, taking ordinary experience seriously, is not commit-
ted in advance to such monocausal explanations.   He welcomes “multicausal (and 
empirically sensitive) explanations,” explanations which refuse the “disconnection 
of ethics from everyday life” (71).
Political philosophy has, somewhat surprisingly, been strangely rooted in re-
mote, abstract, even ahistorical starting points (96, 99).  Once again, this encourages 
the search for monocausal explanations.  Dewey’s avowed task was that of recon-
structing classical liberalism, rethinking its ideals in pluralistic, concrete, pragmatic 
terms. No longer are there a priori absolutes that have typically served to protect 
the privileged. Rather, a central question must always be “what present conditions 
need to be attenuated or removed so that individuals can fl ourish and grow?” (108).
Although oft en associated with progressive education, Dewey, as Hildebrand 
insists, rejected both traditionalist approaches and romantic ones.  Th is latter, pro-
gressive education as Dewey sometimes labeled it, places “excessive reliance on the 
child’s present interests and purposes” (127).  For his alternative, Dewey insisted, 
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in continuity with his criticism of the refl ex arc theory, that children must be rec-
ognized as already “actively engaged agents in life’s ongoing dramas” (129).  Th e 
teacher’s task can then not be the one identifi ed by traditionalists: fi lling the passive 
empty mind with content.  Nor can it be the romantic ideal of letting the children 
follow their own inner impulses.  Instead, teachers must recognize the importance 
of inherited customs, practices, methodologies and cultural literacy, directing stu-
dents’ impulses “toward fruitful expression in history, science, art, and so on” (127).
Th e opening section’s emphasis on experience is revisited in the book’s stron-
gest chapter, that on aesthetics.  Once again, traditional assumptions are challenged. 
In this case, it is the inherited dualism of rational versus emotional.   Overcoming 
this opposition, Dewey “came to believe that art and aesthetics were central, not 
peripheral, to philosophy” (147).  Th is is because art is paradigmatic with regard to 
understanding experience.   Since the aim of philosophy is to “liberate and enrich 
human experience” the aspect of human life that most provides guidance about 
culminating experiences will be central to philosophy.  Great art involves com-
munication.  It provides an “enduring capacity for intensifying and enlivening or-
dinary life” (177). 
When it comes to religion, Dewey neither accepts faith-based creedal claims 
nor submits to hierarchical, antidemocratic institutional structures.  At the same 
time, many people report having a religious experience, testimony which “prag-
matists, committed to a radically empirical starting point, must not dismiss out of 
hand” (184).  Faced with such a situation, Dewey articulated a position which made 
room for a “natural piety” (195) disconnected from “anachronistic beliefs” (188). 
What the religious sensibility most preserves is a sense of how human achievement 
does not occur in a vacuum, but rather develops in cooperation with both natu-
ral conditions and fellow human actors (195).  Religious experience thus serves to 
encourage thinking in terms of the “whole self,” recognizing the interpenetration 
of person and world (192).  In the end, religious faith is “one kind of moral faith,” 
one penetrated by a deep emotional tone and leading to an enduring transforma-
tion of character (195).
Such a comprehensive overview, providing a “detailed account of the wid-
est possible range of Dewey’s philosophical views,” should be judged by how well it 
meets these aims.  In this regard Hildebrand’s text off ers a model accomplishment. 
Th e book’s limitations derive indeed from its strengths and depend, frankly, on pos-
sible divergences of perspective regarding the weaknesses in Dewey’s own positions. 
Did Dewey, for example, draw out the full implications of his starting point 
in experience?  Is he, in other words, someone who transitioned to a philosophy 
rooted in the  primacy of praxis while remaining in many ways limited by commit-
ments that were typical of modernity’s emphasis on theoria, an emphasis accompa-
nied by the search for a method serving as neutral starting point?  If the primacy 
of praxis is indeed central, then the model inquirer would be close to Aristotle’s 
phronimos, the individual with practical wisdom.  Th is is, in important respects, 
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not at all the same as the individual committed to scientifi c method.  Th e latter re-
mains implicated within the philosophical orientation which privileges theoria’s 
neutral starting point. It tends to minimize how value judgments are implicated at 
every level of decision making. Th is important point is appropriately emphasized 
by Hildebrand (57). What is not indicated clearly enough is how this understanding 
that value judgments go all the way down challenges the approach that privileges 
“parallels with scientifi c inquiry” (74).  Th e concrete question here would involve 
making value judgments about which scientifi c inquiries to draw on as parallels: 
meteorology, ecology, biochemistry, geology, parasitology, mechanics?  To claim, 
as Hildebrand properly does, that the similarity with the sciences involves insist-
ing on the hypothetical and provisional nature of inquiries (74) is fi ne, so far as it 
goes.  Th e emphasis on a “method of intelligence” (103) becomes problematic if 
the connotation is that some neutral framework for judging and decision-making, 
some framework beyond that of the practical wisdom approach, can be attained.  
In a more minor way, the lingering privileging of theoria continues to be re-
fl ected even in Hildebrand’s strong chapter on aesthetics.  Here, aft er some careful 
claims about overcoming traditional dualisms, Hildebrand utilizes the surprising 
label “appreciator” (161) to identify individuals interacting with art works.  “Ap-
preciator,” and certainly “autonomous appreciator” (170) remain best suited for 
the museum conception of art that Dewey sought to set aside.  When we think of 
art, as Hildebrand wants us to think of it, as an event a) of participation (147), b) 
of human communication (171), and c) of active, experimental engagements (180), 
the outside, detached spectator as suggested by “appreciator” seems inappropriate. 
“Participant,” “interlocutor,” or “collaborator” would more suggestively indicate the 
kind of serious interaction occasioned by artworks in the fullest Deweyan sense. 
Hopefully, these issues will be taken up as Hildebrand moves to articulate his own 
philosophy of sustainability for the twenty-fi rst century.
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